The emergence of mind in a physical world

The emergence of mind in a physical world

  • Author: Morales Otero, Juan Diego
  • Publisher: Universidad Nacional de Colombia
  • ISBN: 9789587833263
  • eISBN Pdf: 789587833270
  • Place of publication:  Bogotá , Colombia
  • Year of publication: 2018
  • Pages: 233

This book presents an ontologically and methodologically well founded Physicalist proposal that does not lose sight of the special particularity and alleged irreducibility of some of the most obvious phenomena of our existence, such as the human mind. The author provides a compelling argument against the most widely accepted interpretation of Physicalism, Microphysicalism. Morales argues in favor of Emergentism as a non-reductive physicalist proposal that explains the causal reality of higher-level properties as metaphysically dependent but not supervenient on their microphysical bases.

  • Cover
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1. Causation: A Non-Reductive Approach
    • The Nature of Causal Entities
    • Causation and Laws of Nature
    • Counterfactual Theory of Causation
    • Causation and Locality
    • Probability and Intervention
    • Causal Context and the Possibility of Causation in the Special Sciences
    • Summary
  • Chapter 2. The Concept of the Physical and the Overcoming of the Supervenience Theory
    • What Physicalism Is
    • Physicalism as a Contingent Theory
    • What Is It To Be Physical?
    • Microphysical Supervenience as the Criterion for the Physical
    • The Empirical Failure of Microphysicalism
    • Consequences for Determining the Concept of the Physical
    • Finding a Solution to our Problem
    • Summary
  • Chapter 3. Emergentism as Type Macrophysicalism
    • The Idea of Ontological Emergence
    • Emergentism as Type Macrophysicalism
      • Reductive and Non-Reductive Microphysicalism
      • Property Dualism and Contingent Connections
      • Emergence and Metaphysical Dependence
    • Two Types of Ontological Emergence
    • Summary
  • Chapter 4. Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Problem of Causation in the Special Sciences
    • Supervenience and Multiple Realizability
    • The Causal Exclusion Argument
      • The Supervenience Argument
      • The Principle of Physical Causal Closure
      • The Exclusion Principle
    • The Interventionist Account of Exclusion
    • The Argument of Causal Individuation of Natural Kinds
      • Higher Causal Powers as Identical to Lower Causal Powers
      • The Subset Account of Realization
    • Summary
  • Chapter 5. Emergent, Downward, and Mental Causation
    • The Idea of Emergent Causation
      • The Principle of Physical Causal Closure of Emergentism
      • Emergent and Lower Level Causal Powers
      • Testing the Causal Relevance of Higher Level Properties
    • Emergent Causation at the Quantum Level
    • Mental Causation as Emergent Causation
    • Summary
  • Appendix: Functional Reduction of the Special Properties
    • Conclusion
    • References
    • Index

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